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Psychological factors in retrograde amnesia: self-deception and a
broken heart
Abstract
We explored potential contributing psychological factors in a patient (‘XF') with focal retrograde
amnesia, within the framework proposed by Kopelman (2000). In particular, we investigated the
psychological trait of self-enhancement. We constructed a self-report questionnaire measure of
self-enhancement and compared XF's score on this measure with the scores of 61 control participants.
XF was found to have a significantly greater level of self-enhancement than the entire control group,
and also than a smaller sample of age- and sex-matched controls. We propose that heightened
self-enhancement may reflect a premorbid tendency that potentially predisposes individuals to develop
retrograde amnesia.
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Abstract 
We explored potential contributing psychological factors in a patient (‘XF’) with focal 
retrograde amnesia, within the framework proposed by Kopelman (2000). In particular, 
we investigated the psychological trait of self-enhancement. We constructed a self-report 
questionnaire measure of self-enhancement and compared XF’s score on this measure 
with the scores of 61 control participants.  XF was found to have a significantly greater 
level of self-enhancement than the entire control group, and also than a smaller sample of 
age- and sex-matched controls. We propose that heightened self-enhancement may reflect 
a premorbid tendency that potentially predisposes individuals to develop retrograde 
amnesia. 
 
Key words not in title: self-enhancement, positive illusions, self-report measures. 
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Introduction 
Focal retrograde amnesia is an intriguing condition that has received considerable 
attention in the recent literature (see Cortex 2002 Volume 38, and reviews by Kapur, 
2000; Kopelman, 2000). It is characterised by impaired retrograde memory, or inability 
to retrieve remote information, including autobiographical, semantic and in some cases 
procedural memories, in contrast with relatively well-preserved anterograde memory, or 
ability to learn and retrieve new information. The aetiology of this condition is a topic of 
great controversy that raises questions about the long-held organic versus psychogenic 
distinction. 
 
In many reported cases of focal retrograde amnesia, the aetiology is unclear (see 
Kopelman, 2000 for a review of cases), and several authors have proposed that the 
organic/psychogenic dichotomy fails to provide for the common coexistence and 
potential aetiological contribution of both organic and psychological factors (Hodges, 
2002; Kopelman, 2000; Markowitsch, 2002). In an attempt to address this concern, 
Markowitsch et al. (1999, p.227) proposed the term ‘mnestic block syndrome’ as a label 
that acts as “a bridge between the former division into ‘organic’ and ‘psychogenic’ 
caused memory disorders”. Defined as a ‘blockage’ of autobiographical memory 
processing, it is speculated that this syndrome is underpinned by biochemical brain 
processes, specifically the excessive and prolonged release of stress hormones such as 
glucocorticoids that bind to receptors found in memory- and affect-related mesial 
temporal regions. Markowitsch and colleagues (e.g. Markowitsch, 2003; Markowitsch et 
al., 2000) have found altered brain metabolism in memory processing regions, 
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specifically hypometabolism in the right frontotemporal region in a number of patients 
with ‘psychogenic’ or ‘functional’ amnesias. This has led to the notion that organic and 
functional/psychogenic amnesia are ‘two sides of the same coin’, both arising from a 
common brain mechanism. The precipitant of this syndrome is argued to be extreme 
stress against a background of traumatic conditions in early childhood (Markowitsch, 
2003).    
 
A number of studies have documented psychological factors associated with focal 
retrograde amnesia (e.g. Fujiwara et al., 2008; Kritchevsky, Chang, & Squire, 2004). 
Some studies have included an assessment of psychiatric and personality factors using 
scales such as the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) (e.g. 
Kritchevsky, Chang, & Squire, 2004; Markowitsch, 1999), the Symptom Checklist-90-
Revised (SCL-90-R) and the Freiburg Personality Inventory-Revised (FPI-R) (Fujiwara 
et al., 2008), or psychodynamic tests such as the Rorschach and Blacky (Barbarotto, 
Laiacona, & Cocchini, 1996; Serra, Fadda, Buccione, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2007) 
and/or clinical interviews (e.g. Lucchelli & Spinnler, 2002; Papagno, 1998). MMPI 
results have typically showed abnormal scores on the hypochondriasis, schizophrenia and 
depression scales (Kritchevsky, Chang, & Squire, 2004; Markowitsch et al., 1999), and 
psychodynamic tests have suggested histrionic personality traits (Barbarotto, Laiacona, & 
Cocchini, 1996; Serra, Fadda, Buccione, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2007). Clinical 
interviews have revealed either no abnormalities (Case 1 & 3 Lucchelli & Spinnler, 
2002), psychosocial stressors such as relationship break-ups (e.g. Kapur, Ellison, Smith, 
McLellan, & Burrows, 1992; Papagno, 1998) or financial problems (e.g. Case 2 
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Kopelman, Green, Guinan, Lewis, & Stanhope, 1994; Lucchelli & Spinnler, 2002), 
and/or premorbid psychiatric conditions such as depression or post traumatic stress 
disorder (Cases 1 and 5 Fujiwara et al., 2008; all 10 patients Kritchevsky, Chang, & 
Squire, 2004; e.g. Case 2 Lucchelli & Spinnler, 2002). Despite the observation that the 
majority of patients with focal retrograde amnesia reported in the literature have 
premorbid psychosocial stressors or psychiatric conditions, the nature of these potentially 
precipitating factors is not well understood.  
 
In the psychiatric literature, some studies have investigated personality factors associated 
with dissociative conditions. For example, Simeon et al. (2002) used questionnaires to 
examine temperamental, psychodynamic and cognitive schemata factors associated with 
dissociation in patients with DSM-IV defined depersonalisation disorder. They found that 
harm avoidant temperament, immature defences, overconnection and disconnection 
cognitive schemata were significantly correlated with dissociation scores on the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale, and concluded that these personality factors may 
predispose the manifestation of dissociative symptoms. There have been some interesting 
observations from the results of personality inventories in patients with focal retrograde 
amnesia. For example, Fujiwara et al. (2008) found that four of their five patients had 
abnormal scores on the openness dimension of the Freiburg Personality Inventory-
Revised, a validity scale indicating socially desirable behaviour. The authors commented 
that this may reflect the patients’ reaction to their memory impairment. An alternative 
possibility is that this reflects a premorbid personality trait that may predispose 
individuals to focal retrograde amnesia.  
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 Kopelman (2000) has emphasised the need for more detailed reporting of psychological 
factors in patients with focal retrograde amnesia and has noted that many published cases 
on this topic have failed to adequately explore psychosocial contexts. He has proposed a 
model of “social factors and brain systems influencing autobiographical memory retrieval 
and personal identity”, which postulates that severe stress affects frontal/executive 
systems that inhibit the retrieval of autobiographical and episodic memories. This 
inhibition is predisposed and/or exacerbated by a past learning experience of transient 
amnesia, extreme arousal or depression. Anterograde learning and ‘new’ episodic 
memory retrieval remains intact due to the preservation of the medial 
temporal/diencephalic system. Four areas of ‘severe precipitating stress’ are identified, 
namely marital, employment, financial and offence (Kopelman, 2000, p.608). The 
specific nature of these stressors required to elicit an amnesic reaction, however, has not 
been characterised. Kopelman’s model also includes ‘personal semantic belief system’, 
comprising self and identity, in addition to the contribution of temporal and frontal 
executive brain systems.  
 
Other authors have argued that such ‘psychogenic triggers’ are not relevant to the 
aetiology of focal retrograde amnesia (De Renzi, 2002; Lucchelli & Spinnler, 2002). In 
support of this notion there is the observation that despite the frequency and 
heterogeneity of psychosocial stressors in everyday life, focal retrograde amnesia is a rare 
but stereotyped syndrome (Lucchelli & Spinnler, 2002). Furthermore, De Renzi (2002) 
notes that the supposed precipitating event in many cases is a longstanding stressful 
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condition to which the individual has adapted, and he questions how this can precipitate a 
sudden and complete loss of past memories. He argues that the mere finding of a cerebral 
lesion is not sufficient for attributing aetiological significance to that lesion unless the 
features of the symptom in question are congruous with the location of the lesion. Thus, 
“why should we accept that the mere finding of a state of psychic discomfort, no matter 
what its nature, intensity and length, should be responsible for the sudden loss of past 
memories?” (De Renzi, 2002, p.680).  
 
If focal retrograde amnesia partly constitutes a kind of defensive retreat from 
psychosocial stress, one must account for why it is that so few individuals seek this 
refuge. One possibility is that patients with this condition are premorbidly extreme on a 
continuum of self-deception – i.e. premorbidly predisposed to engage in the kind of 
defensive psychological manoeuvring that strategic forgetting involves. For the onset of 
such psychogenic retrograde amnesia to occur, therefore, an individual would not only 
need to be experiencing significant psychosocial stress, but would need to be predisposed 
toward self-protective psychological manoeuvres. This is a possibility that we investigate 
in the present study.  
 
We describe a patient with focal retrograde amnesia and explore the potential 
psychological factors contributing to this condition. In particular, we investigate the 
psychological trait of ‘self deception’, which we operationalise as a tendency to make 
unrealistically positive self-evaluations, or to self-enhance (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & 
Lysy, 2003). We construct a self-report questionnaire measure of self-enhancement for 
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this purpose – specifically a measure of positive illusions (Taylor, 1989; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988).  
 
Patient “XF” 
Patient “XF” is a 25-year-old male who was seen for neuropsychological assessment over 
two days in September 2006 at the Neuropsychiatry service of James Fletcher Hospital, 
Newcastle, Australia. XF provided informed consent to participate in the study.  
 
Background 
The onset of XF’s retrograde amnesia was 8 months prior to assessment. On a Friday 
night he had returned to his parent’s house (where he was living at the time) after 
socialising at the pub where he worked. He was taken home by a friend who thought he 
was drunk. He told his mother he had “lost time”, and complained of headache. 
According to his mother he was otherwise fine and slept for most of the weekend. On 
Monday he phoned the ambulance when his parents were at work. He told the phone 
operator  “I’m in trouble, I need help. I don’t know who I am or where I am”. He was 
asked to read out the address on any mail he could find, and he gave his parents’ address. 
He did not recognise their names or the address. The ambulance report noted that on their 
arrival XF was conscious and sitting in an armchair. He complained of pain in the 
occipital region of head and posterior neck. He said he had woken on the bathroom floor 
and could not remember how he got there and had then phoned the ambulance. He could 
not recall his name, address, date of birth or family situation. Glasgow Coma Score was 
14/15, with one point lost for orientation.  
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 On admission to the emergency department at the local hospital it was noted that XF had 
initial bilateral limb weakness. There were no focal neurological signs. He denied 
substance use, apart from some social drinking. He failed to recognise his parents, brother 
and friends on their arrival. He did not know how to use his mobile phone. Nursing staff 
noted that he was sleeping excessively and was flat in his affect. He was evasive when 
questioned about his mood. His response to most questions was “I can’t remember”. 
 
XF was transferred to the Brain Injury Unit after nine days on the ward. He frequently 
complained of headache that was not relieved by pain medications. The occupational 
therapist noted that he required assistance in identifying kitchen items such as a saucepan 
and chopping board during meal preparation. He did not know how to use a microwave. 
He was, however, able to play a card game in the evening that a nurse had taught him 
during the day, and was able to recall staff names and verbal information. XF was 
oriented within the unit. On his first visit home he asked to go back ‘home’ (to the 
hospital) after half an hour as he felt uncomfortable. He told staff that he was 
uncomfortable kissing and hugging family members. Over the duration of his stay his 
mood improved and he was seen laughing with friends and family. He was discharged 
home after 11 days.  
 
Investigations 
A CT brain scan at the time of presentation was normal, with an incidental finding of 
cysts on the anterior and medial walls of right maxillary atrium. An MRI brain scan and 
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EEG investigation were also normal. A SPECT scan performed 8 months after onset of 
his retrograde amnesia showed mild diffuse hypoperfusion in the left cerebral 
hemisphere, most pronounced in the parietal lobe.  
 
Past medical history 
XF had recurrent otitis media as a young child with removal of grommets at two years of 
age. Five years prior to retrograde amnesia onset he was mugged and hit on the head with 
a brief loss of consciousness but there were no cognitive sequelae subsequent to this. 
Four years prior to the onset he fell down some stairs. He had a brief loss of 
consciousness, and on waking did not recognise his fiancée at the time (see 
marital/relationship section under ‘potential stressors’ below). This occurred on the 
weekend that they had announced their engagement. When his brother arrived XF 
recognised him but commented that he looked older. XF claimed that he (XF) was 16 
years old (he was actually 20 at the time). His ‘fiancée specific’ amnesia was transient 
and resolved after one hour.  
 
Eight months prior to the onset of his current retrograde amnesia XF suddenly collapsed 
in a car park. His mother was with him and reported that he had flu-like symptoms at the 
time. He had a brief loss of consciousness. On waking he was twitchy, drowsy and very 
pale. He had left sided upper and lower limb weakness, which resolved after 40 minutes. 
Three months prior to onset he was punched in the head by a group of boys after 
retrieving a bottle that had been stolen by one of the boys from the bottle shop where he 
worked. He did not lose consciousness but vomited once and had a headache.   
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Social, educational and occupational history 
At the time of assessment XF was living with his parents. His mother reported that they 
are a close family who are open and affectionate with one another. His mother denied any 
significant or traumatic childhood events with the exception of XF being very upset that 
he was unable to say goodbye to his grandfather who died when XF was 18 years old.   
 
XF completed four years of secondary school and described himself as an average 
student. He denied any learning difficulties and did not repeat any grades.  He began a 
locksmith apprenticeship with his uncle, but did not enjoy this so left to undertake bar 
work. At the time of onset he was working as a bar manager at a local pub and studying 
business part time. According to his mother his studies were progressing well. At the time 
of the assessment XF was employed full time as a car detailer at a car sales yard. His 
duties include cleaning sales cars, and adding details such as roof racks. 
 
Potential stressors according to the model outlined by Kopelman (2000). 
Marital/relationship 
XF’s mother reported that his fiancée broke off their engagement two years prior to the 
onset of his retrograde amnesia and that he was ‘devastated’ at the time. He subsequently 
had difficulty sleeping and was frequently tearful for six months. XF’s mother was not 
aware of him having any significant relationships since then, with the exception of a few 
brief ‘flings’.  After his admission to hospital, however, XF’s mother searched through 
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his bags and found a diamond ring. She tracked it to a local jewellery shop and 
discovered that it was purchased just before Valentines Day (3 weeks prior to onset), and 
that he had told the jeweller it was a Valentines Day gift. XF denied any knowledge of 
the ring and it remains unknown who the intended recipient was. None of his friends 
were aware of the ring or of any current girlfriend. The ring was subsequently returned 
and XF was reimbursed. 
 
Financial 
XF moved in with his parents three months prior to onset due to his work hours being 
decreased to only one night per week and consequent financial stress.  
 
Employment 
XF experienced some stress associated with the decline in the number of shifts he was 
allocated at his work, and had intended to search for alternative work at the time of onset. 
 
On the Friday night prior to the onset of retrograde amnesia, XF was socialising at the 
pub where he worked and called his father to say that he had won a cheque in a 
promotional competition but “there may be problems later”. He asked whether his father 
could come by later if needed, which he agreed to do, but XF did not call again. His 
parents were unsure of the nature of the potential ‘problems’. 
 
Offence  
XF and his mother denied any forensic history. 
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 Presentation 
XF presented as a slightly overweight young man who was confident and witty. He 
appeared somewhat indifferent to his memory loss, saying he had “learnt to live with it 
and accept it”. Friends had told him about a documentary of a similar case, but he was 
not interested in seeing it, and commented, “it could be a completely different situation to 
mine. Everyone is looking for answers but I just think if [my memory] is going to come 
back it will. I just take it day to day.” He claimed that he would like to get his memory 
back if he could, and said, “I know that there’s been some bad times but I still want to 
remember”.   
 
XF said that the main disadvantage of his memory loss was the difficulty in meeting 
apparent strangers who claimed to know him. He said, “it’s strange to think they know 
more about me than I do. It’s hard to only be able to say stuff that I’ve learnt about 
myself.” At initial assessment XF claimed to dislike talking about his condition, as it is 
“such a big story”. He commented at this time that friends had encouraged him to sell his 
story to the media but he was not interested: “I don’t want my life under a microscope”. 
On review two months later, however, XF had recorded a story for a local current affairs 
television program. He denied contacting the program and was vague about how they had 
heard of his story; he claimed that they must have seen his comments in an ‘internet 
chatroom’. XF said that appearing on the program was “a way for people he had not 
spoken to for a while to see his story”. He had not told his work mates as he did not want 
to be treated differently, and felt that his appearance on the program “got it out in the 
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open”. XF claimed that he was not given any financial incentive for the interview. He 
was irritated that the reporter had asked his family and friends if they thought he was 
lying, and was upset by their question “what have you got to gain?” He said he did not 
want to be thought of as a liar.  
 
When questioned about any changes in personality XF said he had been told he was now 
more adventurous with food and that his music tastes had changed. He had previously 
loved to sing karaoke and performed at his 21st birthday party, but now felt that he 
“would have to be very drunk to do it”. Interestingly, on review two months after his 
initial assessment he had returned to karaoke singing and recently competed in the grand 
final for his local area. He had 'relearned' the songs he had sung at his 21st birthday party 
for this event. He said, “I’m still a smart ass and am happy to make people laugh. 
Humour seems to work”. He described feeling like a “different person” and commented,  
“I’m 25 years old but experiencing everything for the first time”.  
 
Self report of memory function 
XF described impaired anterograde memory function for the initial three months after the 
onset of his retrograde amnesia (but note the nursing reports in ‘Background’ section 
above). He said his ‘first [new] memory’ after the onset was shaving his beard off and 
listening to music CDs in preparation to go to a music concert with his brother, 
approximately three months after onset. Since then he described normal anterograde 
memory. XF watches television programs such as ’50 years of television’ to learn about 
past events, and commented that this “is usually the reason that I know things”. In regard 
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to procedural memory, XF commented that he had no difficulty driving or swimming, but 
that playing baseball was a ‘whole new experience’ and he had had to relearn all the 
rules, despite having played the game for 10 years.    
 
On review two months after the initial assessment XF reported no change in memory 
function. He remained somewhat indifferent, but commented  “it would be nice to know 
things myself rather than friends telling me”. He denied any depressive and anxiety 
symptoms. He was focused on saving for an overseas trip. His mother denied any 
significant mood symptoms, but noted that he became irritable if things were not going 
his way. She said he is a  “25 year old but has the mind of a child. He just wants to have 
fun all the time, and tires very easily”. She felt that he was more affectionate and loving 
towards her since immediately after the onset of amnesia. Interestingly, while 
interviewing his mother alone, XF became very irritable in the waiting room and called 
her on her mobile phone to say that he was tired of waiting and wanted to leave. His 
mother appeared very anxious and eager to please him and the interview was 
discontinued. 
 
Neuropsychological assessment results 
The results of XF’s neuropsychological assessment are displayed in TABLES 1 and 2. 
With the exception of impaired autobiographical memory function as assessed by the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (M. Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddely, 1990) (AMI, 
see TABLE 2), his performance in all cognitive domains, including verbal, visual and 
semantic memory was intact (see TABLE 1). Of note, XF was able to recognise the faces 
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of a range of famous individuals including sporting stars, actors and current political 
figures, but commented that he had ‘re-learnt’ them after seeing them on TV after the 
onset of his amnesia. He denied any significant depressive or anxiety symptoms as 
assessed by the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck, 1988) and Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales-21  (DASS-21, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) (see TABLE 1). 
___________________ 
Insert TABLES 1 and 2 here 
___________________ 
 
Methods 
Experimental Investigation: 
The following self-report questionnaire measure of self-enhancement was administered to 
XF on the second day of the neuropsychological assessment. 
 
Self-Enhancement / Positive Illusions: Taylor and colleagues (Taylor, 1989; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988) document a series of biased self-perceptions that they refer to as positive 
illusions. These illusions include unrealistically positive self-evaluations and unrealistic 
optimism about the future (which Hoorens, 1995 subsumes under the label "self- serving 
biases"). To illustrate the first, evidence indicates that there is a widespread tendency for 
most people to see themselves as better than others on a range of dimensions - this is the 
better-than-average effect (Alicke, 1985). For example, most business managers consider 
their job performance to be superior to that of others (French, 1968), while most college 
instructors believe that they are better-than-average teachers (Cross, 1977). In regard to 
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the second bias, people tend to believe that they will have a longer-than-average lifespan 
(Myers, 2002), and that their chances of having health problems (e.g. Weinstein, 1982) or 
of becoming the victim of crime (e.g. Perloff, 1987) are lower than average. 
 
Given our intention to measure individual differences in self-enhancement (see Brown, 
1986; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003), we constructed an 18-item instrument for 
the measurement of these positive illusions (see APPENDIX A). Each item is presented 
with an associated rating scale (ranging from 0 to 100%). Participants are asked to rate 
themselves, relative to their “peers”, for each item. In every case a rating of 50% is 
average. The items incorporate a range of randomly intermixed positive characteristics 
(e.g. ethical, kind), negative characteristics (e.g. unhygienic, prejudiced) and negative 
future events (likelihood of developing a drinking problem, or of getting divorced). The 
average of these ratings (after appropriate reverse-scoring for half of the 18 items) was 
used in this study to index an individual's degree of self-enhancement1. 
 
Control Participants: XF’s score on this questionnaire measure of self-enhancement was 
compared with that of a sample of control participants, comprising 61 undergraduate 
psychology students (10 males, 51 females) with a mean age of 20.6 years (SD = 1.8). 
Participants received course credit for taking part and provided informed consent. 
 
Results 
                                                 
1 Note that our measure might, strictly speaking, be considered a measure of self-aggrandizement rather 
than self-enhancement, as it measures the degree to which individuals rate themselves more positively than 
they rate others, rather than the tendency to overestimate one’s positivity relative to a credible criterion (see 
Paulhus, 1998). However, we have followed other authors (e.g. Brown, 1986) in using the more common 
term of self-enhancement. We return to the criterion issue in our Discussion. 
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Based on the responses of our control participants, we first conducted a brief evaluation 
of the positive illusions questionnaire measure we had constructed. In order to investigate 
whether the individual items of the questionnaire elicited positive illusory responses, we 
conducted a series of 18 single-sample t-tests to compare the mean rating of each item 
(reverse-scored if negative) with 50 (in the absence of bias, the mean rating of each item 
should not significantly differ from this value). Owing to the large number of 
comparisons, we adopted a stringent alpha level (.001) so as not to inflate Type I error. 
The mean ratings of all 18 items were significantly greater than 50 at this level, indicating 
that each item elicited positively distorted responses in the control participants. A 
Cronbach’s 〈 of .78 for these 18 items indicated that the internal consistency reliability of 
our measure was satisfactory. 
 
XF’s average rating on our positive illusions questionnaire (78.05) was compared to that 
of the control group (63.05, SD = 8.4) using Crawford and Howell's (1998) modified t-
test2  (one-tailed). XF was found to have a significantly greater level of self-enhancement 
on this measure than the control group, t(60) = 1.78, p = .04. In fact, XF’s score on this 
measure was higher than all but one of our 61 control participants. 
 
Given the high proportion of females in our control sample, we conducted an additional 
analysis comparing XF’s average rating on our positive illusions questionnaire to that of 
an age- and gender-matched subset of our control sample, namely the average rating of 
the ten male control participants (Mean age 20.9 years, SD = 2.4). There was no 
                                                 
2 Computed using Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) singlims.exe program. 
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significant difference in age between XF and this control subgroup, t(9) = 1.62, p = .14.3 
Our finding was unchanged in that XF’s average rating was significantly greater than that 
of the matched control group (60.94, SD = 8.5), t(9) = 1.93, p = .04.4  See Figure 1 for a 
comparison of XF’s scores on the 18 individual questionnaire items with those of the 
matched control group. 
___________________ 
Insert FIGURE 1 here 
___________________ 
 
 
Discussion 
In this case study we have described a patient with focal retrograde amnesia and explored 
potential psychological factors contributing to this condition using the framework 
outlined by Kopelman (2000). In particular, we investigated the psychological construct 
of ‘self deception’, which we operationalised as a tendency to self-enhance. This is the 
first study to document significantly heightened levels of positively biased self-appraisals 
in a patient with retrograde amnesia, compared with controls.  
 
According to the model proposed by Kopelman (2000), there are several psychosocial 
factors that may contribute to the manifestation of ‘psychogenic’ amnesia. He outlines 
four areas of ‘severe precipitating stress’, namely employment, financial, offence and 
marital. XF had only mild employment and financial difficulties and denied any previous 
                                                 
3 (1998) modified t-test (two-tailed). The difference in age between XF and the larger, mixed-gender 
control group was significant using this test, t(60) = 2.47, p = .02. 
4 Crawford and Howell's (1998) modified t-test (one-tailed). 
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forensic offences. In contrast, we can speculate that his marital/relationship situation may 
have been a precipitating stressor. He suffered significant distress two years prior to onset 
after the break up of his engagement, and the discovery of a diamond ring among his 
possessions after the onset of his amnesia raises the possibility that he may have been 
rejected again. There have been previous reports of retrograde amnesia manifesting after 
relationship break ups (see Kapur, Ellison, Smith, McLellan, & Burrows, 1992; Cases F 
& G Kopelman, 2000; Papagno, 1998). Nevertheless, this is a very common psychosocial 
stressor and retrograde amnesia is a rare condition, thus other factors must also play a 
role.  
 
Kopelman (2000) also identifies ‘current emotional state’, specifically ‘extreme arousal’ 
and ‘depression’, as influential in psychogenic amnesia. XF’s family were unaware of 
any emotional problems around the time of onset and denied that he showed any signs of 
distress. However, we could again speculate that he may have experienced ‘extreme 
arousal’ associated with the rejection of his diamond ring and/or the suspicious event in 
the pub a few nights prior to the onset when he called his father asking for help. In terms 
of ‘learning experience’, Kopelman (2000) suggests that past transient experiences of 
organic amnesia are common in cases of psychogenic amnesia. XF had previously 
sustained four mild head injuries and briefly lost consciousness on three of these 
occasions. Of note, four years prior to his current retrograde amnesia he had experienced 
a transient amnesia after falling down some stairs. At the time he was unable to recognise 
his fiancée and believed that he was four years younger than his actual age. This occurred 
on the weekend that he announced his engagement and resolved after one hour. In 
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summary, many facets of XF’s psychosocial status are in keeping with Kopelman’s 
(2000) model and may have contributed to the manifestation of his retrograde amnesia.  
 
An additional component of Kopelman’s (2000) model is a ‘personal semantic belief 
system’, comprising self and identity (see also Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1999). 
We propose that psychological tendencies such as a tendency toward self-enhancement 
form part of this system. Our finding of significantly exaggerated self-enhancement in 
XF is interesting in the light of a recent study by Fujiwara et al. (2008). These authors 
found “a tendency for social desirability” in four patients with retrograde amnesia. This 
was indicated by an unusually low score on the openness dimension of the Freiberg 
Personality Inventory-Revised in three patients, pointing to self repressive tendencies in 
social situations, and a heightened score in one patient, indicating a disregard of social 
norms (Fujiwara et al., 2008). As in our case, these individuals completed the personality 
inventory after the onset of their amnesia, and thus it is impossible to determine whether 
this represents a premorbid trait or a post amnesia state (see further discussion of this 
issue in the Limitations section below). 
 
One feature of our case that is interesting to note is the absence of frontal executive 
dysfunction. XF’s performance on five tests sensitive to executive dysfunction was 
within the normal range. Other case studies of focal retrograde amnesia have also 
reported preserved performance on various executive tests (Di Renzi, Lucchelli, Muggia, 
& Spinnler, 1997; Repetto et al., 2007). In contrast, some cases have shown impaired 
performance on selective executive tests (Fujiwara et al., 2008; Markowitsch et al., 1999; 
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Serra, Fadda, Buccione, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2007). Many others have failed to 
assess executive functions (Barbarotto, Laiacona, & Cocchini, 1996; Kritchevsky, Chang, 
& Squire, 2004; Luccheli, Muggia, & Spinnler, 1998; Nakamura et al., 2002; Sellal, 
Manning, Seegmuller, Scheiber, & Schoenfelder, 2002). Neuroimaging findings 
addressing this issue are also inconsistent. Some studies have documented frontal 
deactivation in psychogenic amnesia (e.g. Markowitsch, 2003; Markowitsch et al., 2000), 
which would suggest impaired performance on frontal/executive tests. In contrast, 
Anderson et al. (2004) documented bilateral dorsolateral frontal activation during 
memory suppression. This fits with Kopelman’s (2000) proposal that the inhibition of 
autobiographical retrieval in some cases of focal retrograde amnesia is due to excessive 
inhibition by frontal control mechanisms, implying supra-normal frontal or executive 
activation and integrity of frontal executive test performance. The limited evidence to 
date prevents any conclusion on this issue. Further research is needed to examine the 
relationship between focal retrograde amnesia and executive functioning.  
 
In regard to ‘organic’ factors that may have contributed to XF’s retrograde amnesia, eight 
months after the onset of his retrograde amnesia he had an abnormal SPECT finding (see 
‘investigations’ section above), specifically mild diffuse hypoperfusion in the left 
cerebral hemisphere, most pronounced in the parietal lobe. Interestingly, this brain region 
contains the precuneus, which has been implicated in a number of functions that are 
highly relevant to this case (see Cavanna & Trimble, 2006 for a review). For example, 
recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the precuneus plays a role in 
episodic memory retrieval. In particular, the left precuneus is activated during retrieval of 
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source information (Lundstrom et al., 2003) and specific autobiographical events (Addis, 
McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004). Furthermore, it has been found 
that this brain region is involved in self processing tasks such as the processing of self 
relevant traits (Kircher et al., 2002) and assigning first person perspective (Vogeley et al., 
2001). It has been suggested that in conjunction with the medial prefrontal regions, the 
precuneus represents a network that links personal identity and past experiences. These 
are the exact functions that are impaired in retrograde amnesia. While this link is 
intriguing, the aetiological significance of XF’s abnormal SPECT finding is unclear, and 
in any case the finding must be considered with caution given the absence of any 
quantitative data and the margin of error associated with reported imaging abnormalities 
on SPECT scans. Future studies will need to explore the integrity of the precuneus in 
patients with retrograde amnesia. 
 
In regard to the previously used terms organic, psychogenic, and functional amnesia, 
XF’s condition is not easily categorised under any of these labels. His retrograde amnesia 
cannot be considered purely organic, given the likely contribution of psychosocial factors 
discussed above. It is not purely psychogenic, as he showed an abnormal SPECT finding, 
suggesting a functional brain abnormality, as discussed above (with appropriate caveats). 
Furthermore, XF’s retrograde amnesia cannot be labelled functional, as there is evidence 
of a brain abnormality and psychological factors, as opposed to no clear evidence of 
either. Thus, this case clearly challenges the organic/psychogenic dichotomy. In keeping 
with the view of other authors (e.g. Hodges, 2002; Markowitsch, 2002), we suggest that 
XF’s retrograde amnesia arises from the coexistence and potential aetiological 
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contribution of both organic and psychological factors, operating either independently or 
as different explanatory levels of a single causative process (in which case retrograde 
amnesia may represent "simultaneously a low-level neurological impairment and a high-
level psychological palliative", McKay & Anderson, 2007, p. 1102; see also McKay, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007, for further discussion 
in the domain of delusions). 
 
Limitations 
It is important to point out some limitations of our study. Firstly, given that XF 
completed our positive illusions questionnaire after the onset of his retrograde amnesia, it 
is impossible to determine whether his heightened self-enhancement represents a ‘state’ 
or ‘trait’. In particular, it is possible that rather than reflecting a cause of his memory 
difficulties, the observed self-enhancement may actually be an effect of those difficulties. 
After all, previous research has indicated that threats to self-esteem can occasion self-
protective attempts to enhance self-esteem (see, for example, Brown & Gallagher, 1992; 
Wood, 1989). Insofar as XF’s memory difficulties (and/or the other psychosocial 
stressors documented above) constituted a threat to his self-esteem, these difficulties may 
have been the impetus for defensive self-enhancement. Future studies might profitably 
administer our self-report measure of self-enhancement (notwithstanding the limitations 
of this measure; see below) to individuals with other forms of memory impairment 
(including amnesias with unequivocally organic aetiologies), to determine whether self-
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enhancement is a unique feature of focal retrograde amnesia or whether it is simply a 
feature of memory impairment per se. 5  
 
In any case, although it is possible that XF’s tendency to self-enhance may have 
developed in association with his retrograde amnesia, we feel that our results are 
suggestive of a more interesting possibility, namely that his results on our questionnaire 
reflect a premorbid tendency that may have predisposed him to develop retrograde 
amnesia. Longitudinal studies of patients with this condition pose obvious logistical 
obstacles, but may be necessary to settle this issue decisively. 
 
A second limitation concerns our methodology for gauging self-enhancement. We 
constructed a self-report measure requiring participants to compare themselves with their 
peers across a range of characteristics and possible future events (c.f. Brown, 1986). Our 
intention here was to measure individual differences in self-enhancement. This approach 
to measuring self-enhancement, however, is open to an important criticism, namely the 
fact that no indicator of external reality is involved (Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995). In 
other words, our approach makes no provision for distinguishing accurate self-
evaluations from positively biased self-evaluations. If XF actually is more intelligent, 
                                                 
5 We note in this connection that other studies have found evidence of positive biases in organic memory 
syndromes. Fotopoulou, Conway, Griffiths, Birchall and Tyrer (2007), for example, found that the 
confabulations of a patient (“LH”) who had undergone surgical clipping of an anterior communicating 
artery (ACoA) aneurysm were significantly more positively valenced than both his true memories and the 
memories of five healthy control participants. Although these authors suggested that LH’s self-enhancing 
confabulations were best explained as the product of motivational influences on memory construction that 
had become heightened as a result of his devastating brain damage (permitting him to ‘escape’ the 
unpleasantness of his reality), they noted that “Interestingly, LH’s pre-morbid behaviour suggested that he 
had always been someone who has tended to inflate his abilities and importance, particularly when 
undergoing stressful and self-threatening periods” (p. 14; see also Fotopoulou, Solms, & Turnbull, 2004; 
Turnbull, Berry, & Evans, 2004). 
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ethical, original and successful (etc.) than most of his peers, then he is not self-enhancing 
by indicating as much on our questionnaire. Given the wide range of items on our 
questionnaire, we think it unlikely that this factor accounts for XF’s significantly high 
score. Nevertheless, we recommend that future investigations of this topic employ 
alternative measures of self-enhancement, for example criterion discrepancy measures 
(which index self-enhancement by the extent to which a participant's self-ratings  are 
more positive than warranted by a credible criterion; see Funder & Colvin, 1997; Jansen, 
Smeets, Martijn, & Nederkoorn, 2006) or perhaps the over-claiming technique (the 
tendency to claim knowledge of non-existent items; see Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 
2003). 
 
In conclusion, we have provided a thorough investigation of psychological and 
psychosocial factors in a patient with focal retrograde amnesia. In particular, we have 
demonstrated for the first time that this condition is associated with significantly 
heightened positive self-appraisals, which we consider to be a form of ‘self deception’. 
While we acknowledge that this case study does not provide proof of any causal 
relationship, we suggest that this heightened level of self-enhancement may reflect a 
premorbid tendency that could potentially predispose individuals to develop focal 
retrograde amnesia. Further research is required to determine the aetiological significance 
of this and other psychological factors in retrograde amnesia. 
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APPENDIX A – POSITIVE ILLUSIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Below are a series of items, each with an associated rating scale. You are asked to rate 
yourself, relative to your peers, for each item. In every case a rating of 50% is average. 
For example, item 1 is “Please rate how intelligent you are relative to your peers”. If you 
feel that you are of average intelligence, you would make a clear mark at 50%. If, 
however, you feel that you are extremely intelligent, in the top 10% of people for 
example, you might make a mark between 90% and 100%. If you feel that you are 
extremely unintelligent relative to your peers, perhaps in the bottom 10% for intelligence, 
you would place your mark below 10%. 
 
These items are not part of a test, and there are no right or wrong answers. Please attempt 
to answer all of them as honestly as you can, and try to answer with the first thing that 
comes to mind – don’t think too much. 
 
Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you for your assistance. 
 
 
 
1. Please rate how intelligent you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
2. Please rate how unreliable you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
3. Please rate how original you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
4. Please rate how friendly you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
5. Please rate how likely it is that you will become infected by the AIDS virus 
relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
6. Please rate how ethical you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
7. Please rate how prejudiced you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
8. Please rate how unhygienic you are relative to your peers. 
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0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
9. Please rate how much you care about social issues relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
10. Please rate your ability to get along with others relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
11. Please rate how good your sense of humour is relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
12. Please rate how kind you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
13. Please rate how bad-mannered you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
14. Please rate how likely it is that you will develop a drinking problem relative to 
your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
15. Please rate how likely it is that you will have a heart attack before age 40 
relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
16. Please rate how successful you are relative to your peers. 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
17. What do you think your life expectancy is likely to be? (50% = average, 
below  50% = below average, above 50% = above average). 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
 
18. If you get married (or if you are already married), how likely are you, 
relative to your peers, to end up getting divorced? 
 
0………10%………20%………30%………40%………50%………60%………70%………80%………90%………100% 
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TABLE 1. Results of neuropsychological tests administered to XF.  
Test Patient XF 
Intellectual functioning: 
Full Scale IQ (WAIS-III) 
Verbal IQ  
Performance IQ 
WAIS-III subtest 
Vocabulary  
Similarities 
Arithmetic 
Digit Span 
Information 
Comprehension 
Picture Completion 
Digit Symbol-Coding 
Block Design 
Matrix Reasoning 
Picture Arrangement 
 
102 
 92 
114 
Age-Scaled Scores  
9 
8 
9 
11 
8 
8 
15 
11 
11 
13 
11 
Verbal memory: 
Recognition Memory Test  (words)         
RAVLT total learning 
Recall after distraction 
Delayed recall 
Recognition 
Logical memory (WMS-III) I 
 
>75%ile (49/50) 
69%ile  
 
58%ile  
 
62%ile  
 
66%ile  
 
ASS = 16 
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                                              II ASS = 14 
Visual memory: 
Recognition Memory Test (faces) 
Visual reproduction (WMS-R) I 
                                                  II 
Rey Complex Figure 
Immediate recall 
Delayed recall  
 
50%ile (43/50) 
99%ile 
99%ile 
 
90%ile 
90%ile 
Language: 
Boston Naming Test 
 
27%ile 
Executive tests: 
Word Fluency: Phonemic (CFL) 
                         Semantic (animals) 
Trail Making Test B 
Stroop (DKEFS) Inhibition  
                            Inhibition/ Switch 
 
 
50%ile 
 
25-50%ile 
 
75-90%ile 
 
ASS = 11 
 
ASS = 13  
Speed of information processing: 
Trail Making Test A 
Digit Symbol-Coding (WAIS-III) 
 
50%ile 
ASS = 11 
Mood: 
Beck Depression Inventory-II 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 
 
5 (minimal) 
1 (normal) 
Abbreviations and normative data used in order of appearance:  
WAIS-III = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III Wechsler DA. (1981) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test-
Revised. The Psychological Corporation: London. 
IQ = Intelligence Quotient.   
%ile = percentile. 
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Warrington EK (1984) Recognition Memory Test. NFER-Nelson Publishing Co. Ltd.: Windsor, Berks. 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test, Schmidt M, (1996) Rey auditory and verbal learning test: 
A handbook. Western Psychological Services: Los Angeles. 
WMS-III/R = Wechsler Memory Scale Revised/3, Wechsler, D (1987) Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised. 
Psychological Corporation: London. 
ASS = Age-Scaled Score. 
Rey Complex Figure: Rey A (1964) L’examen clinique en psychologie (2nd edition). Presses universitaires 
de France: Paris. 
Kaplan EF, Goodglass H, Weintraub S (1983) The Boston Naming Test (2nd edition) Lea & Febiger: 
Philadelphia. 
Word fluency: Spreen O, Strauss E. (1998) A compendium of neuropsychological tests (2nd edition). Oxford 
University Press: New York pp 447-464. 
Trail Making Test A & B: AJA Associates: Iowa City. Army Individual Test Battery. 1944 Manual & 
Directions for Scoring, Washington DC: War Department, Adjutant General’s Office. 
DKEFS = Delis-Kaplan Executive Functions Scale, Delis, D. C., Kaplan, E., & Kramer, J. H. (2001a). 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS). San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II:  Beck AT (1988) The Psychological Corporation: Sidcup, Kent. 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21: Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F. (1995). Manual for the 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. Sydney: Psychology Foundation. 
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TABLE 2. XF’s results on the Autobiographical Memory Interview  
Autobiographical Memory Interview* 
 
Childhood            
Early adulthood                 
Recent life              
Total                        
Personal semantic      Autobiographical  
Maximum 21               Maximum 9 
5                                       0 
4.5 1 
16 4 
25.5/63                              5/27 
*Kopelman M, Wilson BA, Baddeley A (1990) Thames Valley Test Company: Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of XF's positive illusions questionnaire scores with those of the 
matched control group. 
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